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FORMATION OF CONTRACT: THE ROLE OF
CONTRACTUAL INTENTION AND EMAIL
DISCLAIMERS
GILLIAN BLACK*
Introduction
This article examines the role of intention in contract formation.1 Whereasthe focus of consent, and therefore formation, in the past has often been
on the agreement between the parties—establishing whether or not they have
reached consensus in idem—there has been increasing emphasis in recent
cases on the role played by contractual intention. The question of whether the
parties intended their agreement to be legally binding, while present in
previous case law and literature, appears to be developing to play a much
greater role; one which, it is submitted, can and should be used to allow the
parties to regulate their contractual dealings with greater precision.
Before turning to review intention, it is helpful to set out in brief the
essentials of contract formation, including historical developments. The sec-
ond section of this article will then explore the nature of intention and the role
it plays, particularly the potential for expanding the significance of intention in
formation. The third and final section will look at the potential use of
intention in the specific context of contracting by email.
The focus of this review will be very much on Scots case law and academic
writing. Although reference will be made to other sources, including English
law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference where appropriate, this work
is primarily intended to analyse the current state of intention in Scots law.2
Contract formation
Contracting is a juridical act and is therefore bound by juridical rules: the
steps required to conclude a contract are legal in nature, rather than
* Lecturer in Law, University of Edinburgh. This article is based on a paper presented at the
Edinburgh Centre for Commercial Law Workshop on ‘‘The Role of Consent in Contract Law’’, in
December 2009. I am very grateful to Laura J. Macgregor for her helpful comments on that paper
and on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Other essential requirements for formation, such as capacity and form, will not be discussed.
2 English sources need to be treated with some caution here, given certain fundamental
differences in approach north and south of the border. For example, one of the leading analyses
of contract formation states that, ‘‘if an alleged agreement does not contain a promise then clearly
there can be no intention to contract as one of the basal requirements for the presumption to
operate, and for a contract, is missing’’: Michael P. Furmston and Greg J. Tolhurst, Contract
Formation: Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), para.10.06. A further
signifier of intention in English law is provision of a valuable consideration (Furmston and
Tolhurst, Contract Formation, 2010, para.10.17), and see also RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei
Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 753 at [58], [59]. While similar
presumptions as to intention may operate in Scots law, they will not be based on the doctrines of
promise or consideration.
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commercial or social. The elements of contract formation are, in law, ‘‘tools of
analysis’’, to provide certainty and guidance.3
There is widespread agreement that agreement is at the heart of contract
law. Woolman on Contract states: ‘‘Formation occurs when the parties reach
agreement as to the essential features of their transaction.’’4 MacQueen and
Thomson define a contract as:
‘‘. . . an agreement between two or more parties having the capacity to
make it, in the form demanded by law, to perform, on one side or both,
acts which are not trifling, indeterminate, impossible or illegal.’’5
Hogg states that a, ‘‘contract is an agreement, enforceable at law’’,6 which can
be distinguished from a unilateral promise or obligation because the essence
of contract is that it is bilateral.
Critically, while agreement in Scots law is necessary for contract, it is not by
itself sufficient. It is possible for two parties to be in agreement about many
things, without there being a contract. As McBryde says:
‘‘Consent is the basis of contract. It is not enough that the parties are in
agreement. X may wish to sell his car to Y. Y may wish to buy at X’s
price. The minds may be in agreement, but there is no binding obligation
until in some way the intentions of the parties are communicated to each
other.’’7
This passage helpfully draws attention to three different elements: consent,
agreement and intention. The essential ingredient which transforms mutual
consent and agreement into contract is intention. To refer to MacQueen and
Thomson again:
‘‘A contract is formed when the parties have reached agreement—
consensus in idem—on the essential terms of the contract always provided
that they have intention to create legal obligations.’’8
Yet although intention is the essential ingredient, which converts an agree-
ment into a contract, the academic and judicial focus on the process of
3 M. Hogg and G. Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’, in Reinhard Zimmermann, Daniel Visser
and Kenneth G.C. Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.61.
4 G. Black, Woolman on Contract, 4th edn (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010),
para.2–02.
5 Hector L. MacQueen and Joe Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (West Sussex: Tottel,
2007), 2nd edn, para.1.09.
6 M. Hogg, Obligations, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: Avizandum, 2006), para.2.02.
7 William W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: SULI/W. Green,
2007), para.6–02.
8 MacQueen and Thomson, Contract, 2007, para.2.2, emphasis added, footnote omitted.
THE ROLE OF CONTRACTUAL INTENTION AND EMAIL DISCLAIMERS 99
contract formation has typically been on the need for consensus in idem. The
importance of consensus in idem is reflected in the fact that we have developed
detailed rules on the mechanics of consensus, concerning offer and accept-
ance, invitations to treat, qualified acceptances, communication and revoca-
tion, and the postal acceptance rule. Intention is, by comparison, poorly served
by academic and judicial consideration.9
Consideration of intention has typically consisted of reference to two
rebuttable presumptions, in terms of which commercial agreements are
presumed to be binding, and social ones not. Under this presumption,
agreements concluded in a commercial or business setting are presumed to be
intended to be binding contracts, whereas those concluded in domestic or
social circumstances are presumed not to be.10 The presumption can of course
be rebutted in either case, and the courts have recognised that this division is
not one of ‘‘watertight compartments’’.11
There are signs that this is changing, however, as evidenced by a number of
recent cases which have given priority to the need for intention, with some
interesting results. The purpose of this article is to explore the function of
contractual intention, and the nature of these developments. What impact will
these have on professional and commercial practice? And what are the
implications of this for contracts concluded by email, since email raises one
potentially distinct issue?
A historical overview of contract formation
Prior to turning to these recent developments, a brief review of the historical
role of contract law and contract formation can help shed light on certain
aspects of current practice and doctrine. The development of Scots contract
law has recently been examined by a South African academic, Professor
Gerhard Lubbe.12 He notes that early legal actions in Scotland, around the
twelfth to fourteenth centuries, were not based on a principled body of
9 The most detailed academic analysis of contract law is indubitably McBryde’s, Contract, 2007.
In this work, an entire 40 page chapter is dedicated to ‘‘Offer and Acceptance’’ (Ch.6), while
intention receives six pages of analysis, in Ch.5. This pattern is not unusual, and is generally
replicated in other academic writing. Perhaps the most notable academic exchange on the
meaning of intention in Stair is that of McBryde and Stewart in this journal in the early 1990s:
William J. Stewart, ‘‘ ‘Of Purpose to Oblige’: a Note on Stair I, x, 13’’, 1991 J.R. 216; William W.
McBryde, ‘‘The Intention to Create Legal Relations’’, 1992 J.R. 274; William J. Stewart, ‘‘Stair, I,
x, 13: A rejoinder’’, 1993 J.R. 83. More recently, the concept of intention and a very useful
discussion of the historical and natural law context in which Stair was writing has been provided
by Martin Hogg, ‘‘Perspectives on Contract Theory from a Mixed Legal System’’ (2009) 29 OJLS
643.
10 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–06; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract, 2007, para.2.64.
11 Robertson v Anderson, 2003 S.L.T. 235 at [13]. For a detailed discussion of the use of these
presumptions in English law, see Furmston and Tolhurst, Contract Formation, 2010, Ch.10, Pt A.
12 G. Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in Kenneth G.C. Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann
(eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Vol.2.
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substantive law, but on brieves, similar to English writs. Thus, the early law
reveals, ‘‘no generalized pattern of substantive rights and duties, but [instead
it] approached matters from a procedural perspective.’’13 One consequence of
this is that contract doctrine did not at that time exist in any coherent sense.
Instead, the indications are that, pre-Stair, the basis for an action for debt was
not a promise or an undertaking to render a performance, but the rendering
of that performance itself.14 Only where one had provided goods or services
under an agreement, could one sue for failure to pay under that agreement. In
common parlance, the law recognised executed contracts, rather than execu-
tory ones. Where one party had provided goods or services they had a right of
relief against the other party, by way of an action for debt, for any failure to
perform the reciprocal side of the arrangement. Performance was therefore at
the centre of the earliest legal actions.
In the succeeding centuries, however, there was an evolution from pro-
cedural to substantive thought,15 such that, by the seventeenth century,
Viscount Stair could pen his famous dictum, ‘‘every paction produceth
action’’.16 The focus had thus transferred from performance to agreement—
paction. In Stair’s words:
‘‘. . . in the act of contracting, it must be of purpose to oblige, either
really or presumptively, and so much be serious, so that what is expressed
in jest or scorn makes no contract.’’17
This provides the basis, still present in current law, for the need for agreement
and for an intention to be obligated: a serious commitment, not a light-
hearted or jesting agreement. In the words of Martin Hogg and Gerhard
Lubbe:
‘‘Stair distinguish[es] two stages in the formation of a contract: will and
engagement. Parties must pass from merely willing or wishing to contract,
to evidencing this desire by an external manifestation of that will.
Whether an animus obligandi is present is to be assessed objectively.’’18
13 Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2000, Vol.2, p.3.
14 Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2000, Vol.2, p.4.
15 Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2000, Vol.2, p.8.
16 Stair, I, 10, 7.
17 Stair, I, 10, 6; I, 10, 13. See further the discussion on the interpretation of this paragraph in
Stair in the following articles: Stewart, ‘‘‘Of Purpose to Oblige’: a Note on Stair I, x, 13’’, 1991
J.R. 216; McBryde, ‘‘The Intention to Create Legal Relations’’, 1992 J.R. 274; Stewart, ‘‘Stair, I,
x, 13: A rejoinder’’, 1993 J.R. 83.
18 Hogg and Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspec-
tive, 2004, p.39, footnote omitted. See also Stair, who refers to the three stages of contracting as
‘‘desire, resolution and engagement’’. The first two of these are insufficient to conclude a contract,
so that, ‘‘the only act of the will, which is efficacious, is that whereby the will . . . becomes
engaged to that other to perform’’: Stair, I, 10, 2.
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Ultimately, the question was (and is) one of intention:
‘‘The focus of the concern was not whether the end of the transaction
conformed to the sophisticated moral notions of the late scholastics, but
merely whether the parties to an agreement had seriously and deliberately
intended to conclude legal relations.’’19
The position in Scots law today is that the parties must be in agreement and
they must have contractual intention. However, as previously observed, the
rules which have evolved over the years have typically focused on establishing
consensus in idem through offer and acceptance. This is potentially due in part
to the strength of English influence from the nineteenth century onwards.
McBryde notes that, ‘‘English cases on offer and acceptance were frequently
cited in Scotland’’,20 thus adding to the volume of authority in Scots law on the
topic and potentially increasing its prominence in formation theory. In
contrast, the need for intention has often been assumed or, in many cases, has
been the subject of the rebuttable presumptions, based on the commercial/
social agreement dichotomy.
Intention: an objective standard
This leads to the question: what is intention? The parties to a contract may
have many different layers of intentions, not all of which are legally relevant.21
They may intend to profit by the contract, but lack of profit is not then a
ground for avoiding the contract. They may intend to perform X or to pay £Y.
Again, these intentions may be manifest in the contractual obligations they
undertake, but they are not directly relevant for the purposes of formation.
Instead, the relevant intention is the intention of the parties to be bound to a
legally enforceable obligation.
Moreover, this legally relevant intention may not even be their true
intention: it is the outward expression of their inner thoughts which is
relevant, rather than their subjective state of mind. Thus, the relevant standard
of intention to be contractually bound is an objective standard. In a famous
(and oft-quoted) line, Lord President Dunedin said in Muirhead and Turnbull
v Dickson that:
‘‘. . . commercial contracts cannot be arranged by what people think in
their inmost minds. Commercial contracts are made according to what
people say and do.’’22
19 Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2000, Vol.2, p18.
20 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.1–21.
21 See McBryde, Contract, 2007, paras 5–02, 5–05.
22 Muirhead and Turnbull v Dickson (1905) 7 F. 686 at 694. See the comment on this by Hogg,
‘‘Perspectives on Contract Theory from a Mixed Legal System’’ (2009) 29 OJLS 643 at 662.
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The consent to contract—both the agreement and intention—must be objec-
tive. This is explicitly stated by Gloag, who has observed that the intention
required to be proved is not internal intention, ‘‘as a matter of psychological
fact’’,23 but rather the external indicia of agreement. Thus, the:
‘‘. . . judicial task is not to discover the actual intention of each party; it is
to decide what each was reasonably entitled to conclude from the attitude
of the other’’.24
More recently, judicial support for this approach comes from Lord Glennie,
who has expressed the position as follows:
‘‘. . . did the parties reach a stage at the meeting at which they intended
to be (and regarded themselves) as bound—or at least, since their
conduct must be viewed objectively and private reservations are irrele-
vant, did they so conduct themselves as to lead the other reasonably to
conclude that they had made such an agreement?’’25
From this, it is clear that the intention to contract is not an actual or inward
intention, but is based on objective evidence: what the parties said and did,
not what they thought in their inmost minds.
This objective assessment of intention can override the generally agreed
understanding of certain terms in commerce. While documents such as ‘‘heads
of agreement’’ and ‘‘heads of terms’’ may be assumed by commercial parties to
be a roadmap to guide future relations, rather than a contract, this can be
challenged if the parties did (objectively) demonstrate a serious intention to
be contractually bound by them. Despite the defender’s submission that, ‘‘the
Heads of Agreement were, as a generality, not intended to be legally binding,
being only ‘an agreement to agree’’’,26 Lord Carloway disagreed:
‘‘The document entitled ‘Heads of Agreement’ bears all the hallmarks of
an agreement intended to be legally binding upon its parties. First, it
deals with a commercial bargain and not some social or trivial engage-
ment. Seconds, it purports to be ‘heads of agreement’, that is to say an
expression of consensus reached by the parties. Thirdly, it is typed,
signed, dated and even witnessed. All of these point towards it being, and
intended to be, an enforceable contract.’’27
23 William M. Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1929), p.7.
24 Gloag, Contract, 1929, p.7.
25 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494 at [56],
emphasis added.
26 Latta v Burns [2004] ScotCS 27 at [4].
27 Latta v Burns [2004] ScotCS 27 at [10].
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Nonetheless, the stated need for ‘‘intention’’ does have the potential to give
rise to confusion, since intention could be thought of as the actual or inward
intention of the parties, rather than the external manifestation of it. As
McBryde says, in clarification:
‘‘It is debatable to what extent, in Scots law, the parties’ intentions are
relevant, in the positive sense of requiring intention to create legal
relations as a prerequisite for an enforceable contract . . .’’.28
The most that can be said for the subjective will or intention of the parties is
that, where there is a:
‘‘. . . clash between ‘inward and unknown’ resolution and ‘words . . .
clearly obligatory and serious’, preference will be given to the external
impression of the subjective will communicated by the words used in the
particular circumstances of the case.’’29
Accordingly, the conclusion again is reached that:
‘‘Parties’ actual intentions are irrelevant and they do not have to prove,
and may not be allowed directly to prove, what their state of mind was.’’30
Where intention equates to actual or subjective intention, then there can be
no role for it in Scots law. So long as ‘‘intention’’ to contract is interpreted to
mean the outward-facing intention, objectively discerned, however, then it is
indeed part of Scots contract law.31
Consequences of objective intention
The fact that intention is objectively discerned has a number of consequences.
In the first place, there is no need for, or right to, any enquiry into the actual
state of mind of the parties at the time of conclusion of the contract.32 Nor is it
possible for a party to escape from his contractual obligations at a later date
28 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–02.
29 Lubbe, ‘‘Formation of Contract’’ in A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2000, Vol.2, pp.17,
18.
30 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–02.
31 This is not restricted to intention: the agreement of the parties is also discerned objectively,
with the consequence that there may be contracts where the parties are not, subjectively, in
agreement at all, but their objective actions give rise to an apparent consensus in idem. A good
example of this is Thomson v James (1855) 18 D. 1, where the letter of withdrawal arrived the
same day as the letter of acceptance, and the contract was nevertheless upheld, although the
parties were never in subjective agreement at the same time, and barely in objective agreement at
the same time.
32 As confirmed by Lord President Dunedin in Muirhead and Turnbull v Dickson (1905) 7 F.
686 at 694.
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by saying that he did not intend in his inmost mind to enter into a contract.33
A further consequence of the objective standard of intention is that the whole
circumstances of the case become relevant, since these will impact on what
one party was entitled to deduce from the words and actions of the other. The
objective interpretation of intention requires consideration of the objective
circumstances of the case. Three such circumstances will be examined which
are not necessarily explicit in the literature, but which can, it is submitted, be
derived from case law. These are: transactions in re mercatoria; the specific
commercial context in which the parties are operating; and the specific custom
and practice of the parties themselves.
In the first place, transactions that are in re mercatoria will be treated as
such by the courts. Where a dispute as to contractual formation arose in the
1964 case of R&J Dempster v Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd,34 with
the defenders pleading that the arrangement was intended to bind only one
party to reserve a steel quota, without obliging the other party to take up that
reserved quota, the Inner House observed that: ‘‘It is difficult to believe that
two commercial firms would make so one-sided a bargain’’.35 Thus, the
objective intention of the parties was assessed against the commercial
background of the transaction, and the court concluded that each party was
entitled to interpret the actions of the other as intended to be legally binding,
by virtue of the fact that they were dealing in re mercatoria. In this context, two
parties would be unlikely to make a one-sided bargain, unless they both
expressly stipulated it to be so.
More recently, the Outer House in Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon
Homes Ltd36 took similar consideration of the commercial nature of the
parties and the deal; specifically, in this case, the fact that commercial parties
could be expected to know that transactions for the sale and purchase of land
required to be in writing. The Lord Ordinary was of the opinion that the law
would require:
‘‘. . . some indication from the parties, from their words or conduct, that
they did in fact intend to be bound notwithstanding the informality of
their writings. The position is a fortiori where there is nothing in writing
at all.’’37
Thus, the lack of formal writing for a commercial property transaction would
tend to indicate that the relationship was still at an informal stage, unless
there was a clear indication to the contrary.
33 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–02.
34 R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, 1964 S.C. 308.
35 R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, 1964 S.C. 308, per Lord
President Clyde at 328.
36 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494.
37 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494 at [58].
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Secondly, the courts are prepared to take into account the particular field in
which the parties are operating, and what would be typical custom and
practice in that field. In R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering
Co Ltd, the Inner House took notice of the ‘‘usual practice’’ in the relevant
industry in general.38 The fact that the parties here had not agreed a price was
not to be taken as indicative of a lack of contractual intention, but was in fact
simply reflective of the commercial situation, whereby the parties were
contracting against a background of steel shortages and quota systems. This
was an important element to be taken into account in determining the
intention of the parties:
‘‘The undertakings were expressed in quite unconditional terms on both
sides, and in the existing market conditions the obligations respectively
undertaken represented a sound and intelligible business proposition for each
party.’’39
These cases show that the situation and background to the parties’ negotia-
tions is critical: any special circumstances and commercial custom in that
sector will be relevant.
The third factor which impacts on the interpretation of intention in an
individual case is evidence of the custom and practice of the parties
themselves, as revealed through the past history of their dealings. Past
behaviour between the two parties can be taken to shape their current
dealings. This can be seen in WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd,40
where the Outer House accepted that the intention of the parties had to be
objectively discerned against the background of their previous contractual
relations. Since the previous four contracts concluded between the parties had
all been in formal writing, the lack of a written contract on the fifth occasion
indicated that the parties lacked the necessary contractual intention—albeit
there was full consensus on all terms of the contract, and there was no legal
requirement for formal writing.
Perhaps all these factors can be summarised by a recent judgment from
Lord Hodge, Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd.41 He refers to the
standard of intention to be shown, which requires:
‘‘. . . the court [to] adopt[s] an objective approach, having regard to what
the parties said and did in the course of the negotiations . . . It asks what
would reasonable and honest men in the position of the parties and
38 R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, 1964 S.C. 308.
39 R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, 1964 S.C. 308, per Lord
President Clyde at 326.
40 WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd [2004] ScotCS 189.
41 Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd [2009] CSOH 95; affirmed at [2009] CSIH 95.
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having their shared knowledge of the surrounding circumstances have
understood by the communications which passed between them.’’42
This ability to take into account both wider circumstances and those peculiar
to the parties is not unique in Scotland. The Draft Common Frame of
Reference also requires intention and agreement to constitute a contract, and
makes specific provision that:
‘‘. . . the intention of a party to enter into a binding legal relationship . . .
is to be determined from the party’s statements or conduct as they were
reasonably understood by the other party.’’43
This allows for an objective interpretation of intention, but set against the
facts or circumstances which are specific to the parties.
To conclude this section on the role of intention in contract formation, it is
helpful to make reference to a decision of the United Kingdom Supreme
Court, in an English appeal: RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller
GmbH & Co KG.44 This case raised fundamental problems of formation of
contract in a very realistic commercial setting, reflecting the complex dealings
between the parties and protracted negotiations. Despite the complexities, the
Supreme Court reiterated the applicability of the essential principles:
‘‘The general principles are not in doubt. Whether there is a binding
contract between the parties and, if so, upon what terms depends upon
what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of mind,
but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by
words or conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that
they intended to create legal relations and had agreed upon all the terms
which they regarded or the law requires as essential for the formation of
legally binding relations.’’45
Intention and post-contractual dealings
A further aspect to ascertaining intention at the stage of contract formation
(or what is alleged to be the point of contract formation) is that the courts are
willing to take post-‘‘contractual’’ dealings into account. At first sight, this may
seem unusual, unnecessary and potentially unfair: why should actings after the
42 Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd [2009] CSOH 95 at [25], emphasis added.
43 Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (The
Hague: Kluwer, 2000), DCFR art.II.—4:102, emphasis added.
44 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1
W.L.R. 753.
45 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1
W.L.R. 753 at [45].
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alleged moment of conclusion be relevant?46 In fact, it does make sense. Any
litigation is likely to involve some ex post facto rationalisation, as the parties
attempt to interpret the facts as best fits their case. The parties have good
reason to interpret their pre-contractual actings in a way that best suits their
own ends, insofar as possible. Lord Glennie has observed of the witnesses in
one case, that, although he was satisfied that their evidence was honestly
given: ‘‘I consider [it] was coloured by a mixture of hindsight and reconstruc-
tion’’,47 while in another Lord Hodge noted that one witness had engaged in a
considerable amount of ‘‘retrospective rationalisation’’.48
Where however the court is not limited to the evidence of the parties given
in the context of litigation, but can take account of the parties’ actions after
the alleged moment of contract formation, this can potentially shed light on
the intentions of the parties at that time. If, for example, the pursuer is
attempting to claim that a contract was concluded on November 1, when there
was agreement on all the essentials but not on a more minor matter regarding
delivery, for example, then it may be illuminating to consider the party’s
actions in the days and weeks following November 1. If, in that time, he sent
repeated emails or letters requesting conclusion of the contract and urging
speed so that he could have the certainty of a concluded contract, this would
indicate, objectively, that whatever that party is now claiming he did not
previously believe, objectively, that he was in a contractual relationship as at
November 1.
This approach can be seen in R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge &
Engineering Co Ltd. Here, Lord President Clyde stated that:
‘‘I am confirmed in my conclusion that a binding contract had been made
between the parties by a consideration of their subsequent actings . . . In
my opinion the Lord Ordinary was well founded in concluding, as he did,
that for more than a year after the bargain was made both parties acted
on the basis that there was a binding agreement.’’49
The utility of post-contractual dealings was considered in a recent English
Court of Appeal decision. Here, the court noted that:
46 This requires particular consideration, in light of the fact that post-contractual conduct is,
with some exceptions, not relevant or admissible in relation to the interpretation of contracts: see
McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.8–30; Carole Lewis and Laura Macgregor, ‘‘Interpretation of
Contract’’ in Kenneth Reid, Reinhard Zimmermann and Daniel Visser (eds), Mixed Legal Systems
in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), p.66. For further consideration of contractual interpretation, see David
Cabrelli, ‘‘Interpretation of contracts, objectivity and the elision of the significance of consent
achieved through concession and compromise’’, 2011 J.R. 121.
47 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494 at [57].
48 Shaw v James Scott Builders & Co [2010] CSOH 68 at [41].
49 R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, 1964 S.C. 308, per Lord
President Clyde at 327, emphasis added. See also Shaw v James Scott Builders & Co [2010] CSOH
68 where the (lack of) reaction from the pursuer and her agents was indicative of the defender’s
contractual actions (at [39]).
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‘‘The defendant’s fourth submission was that the judge wrongly had
regard to the parties’ conduct and exchanges after 9 January 2009 in
determining whether a contract was concluded on that day. It is clear
from the judgment that he did take account of subsequent conduct and
exchanges. Whether or not he was entitled to do so, we are satisfied that
the existence of a contract made on 9 January 2009 is clearly established
by reference only to exchanges [before and on that date].’’50
While it is perhaps disappointing that the court did not take the opportunity
(for English law at least) to clarify whether actions after the alleged date of
completion were judicially relevant, it is nevertheless interesting to note that
the High Court judge was clearly minded to refer to them as relevant and that
the Court of Appeal did not think it necessary to overrule that approach
explicitly.51
Application of intention to contract formation
Having established how intention is assessed, and the factors that the courts
will take into account in determining the objective intention of the parties, it is
now possible to consider how intention impacts on contract formation, and
how it can be used by the parties to protect their own interests.
It is submitted that intention fulfils a number of different roles. In the first
place, and most obviously, intention to be contractually bound transforms
agreements into contracts. Intention in this case helps us to distinguish
between agreements which are intended to have the full backing of the law,
and those which are informal. In many cases, this will map on to the
commonly stated presumption that commercial agreements are intended to be
legally binding, while social and domestic arrangements are not,52 albeit these
presumptions are rebuttable—and can of course be rebutted by bringing
evidence of the objective intention of the parties.53
While this is a critical role for intention, however, it is well established and
non-controversial. I would suggest that a close reading of recent cases
demonstrates an expanding role for intention, such that it can be applied in a
more sophisticated way to achieve two different ends. In these cases, the
emphasis has moved away from consensus, to consider instead whether there
is a binding relationship by virtue of the intention of the parties.
This has led to some interesting results, including one where what would
appear to be a contract under the ‘‘offer and acceptance’’ analysis has been
held not to be a contract at all, because of a lack of contractual intention: WS
50 Immingham Storage Co Ltd v Clear Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 89 at [34].
51 See also the approach taken by the Supreme Court in RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei
Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 753.
52 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–06.
53 Robertson v Anderson, 2003 S.L.T. 235.
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Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd.54 Here, the parties were in full
agreement on all the terms of the deal, and those terms had been reduced to
writing. The only missing element was the signature of each party on the
written document. Since the subject matter of the agreement was the provision
of distributorship services, rather than the sale and purchase of land, this
should not have been an issue.55 There was no legal requirement that the
agreement be reduced to writing: the law simply required consensus in idem
and an intention to be bound.
If the court had only been looking for agreement on the contract terms,
then there would have been nothing further to be done: the parties were
clearly in full agreement as to the contract terms. But when the court
considered intention, the absence of a signature on the paper enabled the Lord
Ordinary to conclude that there was no binding contract:
‘‘The evidence in this case . . . persuaded me that the intention of the
parties was that they would only become bound by the terms of that
document only when it was signed on behalf of them.’’56
Thus, intention was used to delay the moment of contract formation, despite
the fact that an offer and acceptance analysis would hold that the parties had
consented and were in full agreement.
Interestingly, it is not clear that the English approach goes quite this far. In
RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG the parties
had agreed on certain key details, including the price, and this was viewed as
strong evidence of an intention to be bound.57 Whether there was an intention
to be bound:
‘‘. . . can be tested by asking whether the price of £1,682,000 was agreed.
Both parties accept that it was. If it was, as we see it, it must have formed
a part of a contract between the parties.’’58
While this decision may indeed be the correct one based on the evidence of
the parties’ intention to be contractually bound, it arguably should not be
based (in Scotland at least) simply on the fact that the parties had agreed a
price. It is suggested that, absent a doctrine of consideration, agreement of a
price in itself should not be equated with a concluded contract. As WS
54 WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd [2004] ScotCS 189.
55 The Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 does not require distributorship agree-
ments to be in formal writing: see s.1.
56 WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd [2004] ScotCS 189 at [53].
57 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1
W.L.R. 753 at [58], [59].
58 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1
W.L.R. 753 at [58].
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Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd59 demonstrates, there may well be a
situation where the parties agree a price for work to be done but nevertheless
have no intention to be contractually bound at that stage, and do not ever then
reach a stage of contracting. While WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co
Ltd is of course a decision of the Outer House, rather than the Supreme
Court, it is submitted that there is a significant reason for preferring the
Scottish authority on this point, given that Scots law does not require a
consideration as part of the formation of contract.
In light of the significance of the parties’ intention in formation of contract,
it would seem that intention can be used by the parties to regulate their
relationship with more precision than the standard rules on offer and
acceptance allow for. Whereas the rules of offer and acceptance would hold a
contract concluded as soon as agreement on the essentials can be discerned,
when we place the emphasis on the need for intention, the question moves
from agreement on the essentials, to the desire of the parties to be
contractually bound.
This enables the parties to take two contrasting positions. In the first place,
they can agree that they do not intend their arrangement to be legally binding,
notwithstanding the fact that they have reached full agreement on the
essentials or, indeed, on every term. Conversely, they can use intention to
indicate that they do intend to be legally bound, notwithstanding the fact that
certain essentials or formalities have not been complied with.
While the first point has been illustrated in WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie
Liqueur Co Ltd, the second use of intention gains support from the Outer
House decision in Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd.60 Here,
the parties had been in negotiations for several years for the sale and purchase
of land, and had reached agreement on the land to be sold and the price to be
paid, although the detailed terms of the development deal remained outstand-
ing. When the sellers changed their mind about the sale and tried to walk
away, the purchasers argued that there was a concluded oral contract, which
was binding despite the fact that it had not been reduced to writing as it
needed to be.
Lord Glennie considered whether the parties could overcome the need for
agreement on the essentials by their objective intention, and held that this was
possible:
‘‘As the case law has developed, it has become clear that the test of what
is or is not ‘essential’, in the sense of needing to be agreed before the
parties will be held to have concluded a bargain, is subjective, not
objective. The court does not categorise a term as essential, and then
59 WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd [2004] ScotCS 189.
60 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494.
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require agreement to have been reached on it, if the parties have made it
clear that they intend to be bound regardless of not having agreed it. In
other words it is up to the parties to decide, expressly or by implication,
which terms are essential for these purposes and which are not.’’61
However, he continued that:
‘‘[But] the point works both ways. A matter which objectively might not
appear to be one of the essentials of the contract may be regarded by the
parties themselves as something which they require to agree before they
are to be bound.’’62
Having considered the evidence in Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon
Homes Ltd, Lord Glennie concluded that there was no binding agreement, not
least because the parties did not obviously demonstrate any intention to be
bound following the key meetings that the pursuers relied upon:
‘‘I cannot find on the evidence that there was any intent on either side to
be bound at that meeting or that, looking at the matter objectively,
anyone would reasonably come to the conclusion that there was such an
intent.’’63
The Supreme Court has also adopted this approach, making it quite clear that
the formation of a contract turns on an objective assessment of the subjective
requirements of the parties, and what they themselves regarded as essential:
‘‘Even if certain terms of economic or other significance to the parties
have not been finalised, an objective appraisal of their words and conduct
may lead to the conclusion that they did not intend agreement of such
terms to be a pre-condition to a concluded and legally binding
agreement.’’64
This interpretation of the evolving role of intention can be seen to confer
upon contracting parties the freedom to introduce their own contractual rules
61 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494 at [49].
At first sight, Lord Glennie’s reference to a subjective test, not an objective one, seems to
contradict the foregoing discussion. However, this comment is made in relation to what the
parties, jointly, regard as essential for their contract—which is a subjective test (albeit one
presumably based on the objective expressions of the parties). Thus, the essentials of the contract
are not determined by objective standards, but according to what the parties themselves view as
essential: a subjective standard.
62 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494 at [50].
63 Aisling Developments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2008] CSOH 140; 2009 S.L.T. 494 at [57].
64 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1
W.L.R. 753 at [45].
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governing formation of contract. These could take the form of a requirement
for a formal written document where one would not otherwise be required, as
in WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd, or conversely waiver of
elements which would otherwise be demanded by law, where the parties
nonetheless wish to be contractually bound without them, such as an essential
term of the contract, for example the price as in R&J Dempster Ltd v
Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd. If we take this approach a stage
further, it would even enable parties to conclude a binding contract even
absent a legal formality such as writing, as was discussed in Aisling Develop-
ments Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd.
This interpretation would allow parties to regulate their relationship in
accordance with their own preferences, through the need to cross this final
hurdle prior to conclusion: the need for evidence of intention to enter into a
binding legal relationship. Until that moment, where objectively communi-
cated intention can be ascertained, either party can walk away. Support for
this approach comes from Lord Clarke’s judgment in WS Karoulias SA v
Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd, where he states that the question at issue was:
‘‘. . . whether or not it was the parties’ intentions, as objectively discerned
from the relevant facts and circumstances that, notwithstanding that they
had agreed the terms of the deal, they had postponed its coming into legal
effect until they acknowledged its terms formally by executing the
document in which the terms were set out.’’65
Taken to its logical conclusion, the lack of intention to enter into legal
relations means that, in the words of McBryde:
‘‘The parties may expressly state that their agreement is not to be
enforced by law. It is thought that, generally, this can be effective just as
parties may exclude the jurisdiction of the courts by referring their
dispute to arbitration.’’66
Intention also helps explain why incomplete contracts are nevertheless treated
as binding in one particular situation: where there has been performance. It is
certainly noticeable that courts are more willing to uphold and enforce
‘‘contracts’’, even where the existence of that contract is disputed, where there
has been performance. Thus, although the parties in Avintair Ltd v Ryder
Airline Services Ltd had clearly not reached consensus on one of the essential
terms, the fee to be paid, the court was prepared to imply the necessary term
into the contract, to allow the pursuer to recover for the work done.67 This too
65 WS Karoulias SA v Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd [2004] ScotCS 189 at [50], emphasis added.
66 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–09. One example of this in practice is the English case of
Rose & Frank Co v JR Crompton & Bros Ltd [1925] A.C. 445.
67 Avintair Ltd v Ryder Airline Services Ltd, 1994 S.C. 270.
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was at issue in R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd,
and again the court upheld the contract.68
Performance also helps explain the outcome in RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v
Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG.69 Here, the draft agreement between
the parties contained a ‘‘subject to contract’’ clause, such that the contract was
not intended to be binding until the written documents had been signed by the
parties. Although the draft documents remained unsigned (and in draft), the
Supreme Court nevertheless held that a concluded contract was in existence.
This would also appear to conflict with the decision in WS Karoulias SA v
Drambuie Liqueur Co Ltd, where a concluded but unsigned contract was held
by Lord Clarke not to be binding. However, the key difference is performance.
The fact that negotiations stalled in August, yet performance continued up
until November was highly significant. The actings of the parties are thus a
very strong indicator that matters have moved from negotiation to consensus.
In the RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG case,
performance was effectively taken to be a waiver of the need for a written
agreement between the parties, and demonstration of their intention to be
contractually bound.
To some extent, the significance of performance appears to reflect the
historical basis for recovery in medieval actions, where the action for debt was
only possible if there had been performance, rather than simply agreement to
perform. Performance renders the contract executed and therefore subject to
enforcement. As McBryde has stated: ‘‘The fact that a contract is executed
rather than executory has been described as ‘a consideration of the first
importance on a number of levels.’’’70
While these cases are understandable from the perspective of the courts’
desire to see justice done between the parties (by enabling the one who has
done the work or provided the goods to recover the cost of those goods or
services) they can also be explained on the grounds of intention. The
performance itself is demonstrative of the practical, and objective, intention of
the parties to be legally bound. It does, however, fail to address the situation
where the performance is entirely unilateral, such that one party can effec-
tively complete the contract by carrying out his side of the bargain without any
input from the other party, and then raise an action for the contract price.71 In
68 R&J Dempster Ltd v Motherwell Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, 1964 S.C. 308. See also
McBryde, Contract, 2007, paras 5–68—5–70.
69 RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mu¨ller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1
W.L.R. 753.
70 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.5–16, in the context of contracts void from uncertainty, and
citing Steyn L.J. in G Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 25 at 27.
71 Although this was the situation in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] A.C. 413;
1962 S.C. (HL) 1, where unilateral (and unwanted) performance—in the face of an attempt to
terminate the contract—was upheld and gave rise to a claim for payment.
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these situations, the basis for recovery may more accurately lie in the field of
unjustified enrichment.72
Email disclaimers
Having examined recent case law which has recognised that intention can be
used to allow the parties to control the moment of contract formation, I now
wish to turn to some consequences of email disclaimers. These disclaimers, as
will be seen, are used by parties in an attempt to control their obligations and
liabilities to other parties. Accordingly, the interaction between email dis-
claimers and intention to contract is worth exploring.
Email is now an inevitable part of commercial life: most commercial
contracting parties are likely to advance their negotiations partially or even
wholly by an exchange of emails. There is nothing inherently different about
concluding contracts by email, as opposed to by fax or by letter. It is still
possible to analyse the correspondence to identify the offer and acceptance,
and the moment of consensus in idem, although there may be a lot of emails to
review, some in admittedly rather informal language.
This informality of language has been considered judicially, and in fact it
appears that it does not stand in the way of ascertaining an objective intention
to be contractually bound. As Lord Hodge concluded in Baillie Estates Ltd v
Du Pont (UK) Ltd:
‘‘In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the informal nature of the
email communications of 17 and 19 November 2006 points towards an
intention to postpone the formation of a contract. On the contrary, the
instruction to go ahead and the response that it’s on the way would
suggest to reasonable persons that the parties were agreeing a binding
deal.’’73
Accordingly, the informality of what was said is not necessarily an issue in
demonstrating either intention or agreement.
These comments echo those of the Inner House from the 2003 decision of
Robertson v Anderson. Here, the court held that the agreement to share the
bingo winnings was:
‘‘. . . undoubtedly an informal arrangement made between friends, [yet]
the Lord Ordinary was nevertheless entitled to conclude that it was an
agreement which gave rise to legal consequences . . . an intention to
create legal relations can be inferred.’’74
72 Hector L MacQueen, Unjustified Enrichment: Law Basics, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: W. Green,
2009), especially Chs 4 and 8.
73 Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd [2009] CSOH 95 at [28].
74 Robertson v Anderson, 2003 S.L.T. 235 at [15].
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Thus, the informality of the communication, whether by email or otherwise,
does not stand in the way of its contractual intent, so long as that can be
ascertained from the communications of the parties, as in every question of
formation.
One particular element of emails is novel, however, and does set them aside
from other forms of commercial correspondence. This is the standard use of
email disclaimers. The email disclaimer is the wording which is automatically
appended to each email leaving a company or firm. It is added by the email
system once the sender has hit ‘‘send’’, and is usually only appended when the
email is directed to a recipient outside the company or firm. Typically, the
disclaimer will only be visible to the recipient, rather than to the sender.
The organisation sending the email, and therefore the email disclaimer, can
use this automatic wording as a way of conveying certain information to the
recipient, usually in the form (as the name suggests) of a disclaimer of legal
liability. Standard wording might state that the sender accepts no liability for
any viruses in the email, that the message is confidential, that there is
copyright in the content of the message, and that the email is not intended to
give rise to any legal liability.
The earlier discussion made the point that the parties can use contractual
intention as a way of determining when a contract is concluded, by making it
explicitly clear whether and, if so, when they intend to be legally bound. When
we combine this with the use of an email disclaimer this should, in theory,
allow the sender to take this control, by using the disclaimer to make it quite
clear whether or not the email is to have legal effect. For example, standard
disclaimer wording might read:
‘‘Unless expressly stated to the contrary, this email and its contents shall
not have any contractually binding effect on the firm or its clients and any
writings which are or could form the basis of any agreement are subject to
contract.’’75
This purports to negate any contractual effect of the substantive content of the
email.
A slightly different approach could be:
‘‘The contents of this email do not give rise to any binding legal
obligation upon the company unless subsequently confirmed on headed
business notepaper sent by fax, letter or as an email attachment.’’
Here, the disclaimer seems to envisage that the email could give rise to a
binding obligation, but only where additional steps have been taken to attach
the details as a letter on headed notepaper, or sent on by fax.
75 This of course gives rise to the tricky question of ‘‘subject to contract’’—a debate which will
not be pursued here. See further McBryde, Contract, 2007, paras 5–35—5–44, especially 5–42 and
Furmston and Tolhurst, Contract Formation, 2010, Ch.9, Pt C.
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Some problems and pitfalls with email disclaimers
Whether either or both of these attempted disclaimers (or others in similar
terms) would be successful is open to question. It is certainly the case that
email disclaimers give rise to a number of different problems and, on the one
occasion where they have been judicially considered in Scotland, the court did
not embrace them enthusiastically, as will be seen. Before turning to that case,
it is helpful to consider five possible sources of uncertainty arising from the
use of email disclaimers.
The first issue is that the email disclaimer is not tailored to each individual
situation, but uses standard wording which is applied indiscriminately to each
and every email leaving the sender’s organisation. It is therefore not the
expression of the organisation’s contractual intention on a particular occasion,
but the contractual intention of the organisation as a general rule. Since the
wording is generic rather than specific, questions could arise as to what extent
it reflects the intention of the sender or the organisation on any specific
occasion.
The second and third points are closely related to each other, and to the
generality of disclaimers. Because they are applied centrally and automatically,
neither the sender nor the recipient usually knows what the disclaimer says.
The individual sender is unlikely even to see the wording because it is applied
only when leaving the sender’s email system, thus potentially leaving him
unaware that one is used or, even if aware that a disclaimer is used, he may be
in ignorance as to what it says. As regards the recipient, human nature
suggests that he is unlikely to read the small print in an email, especially where
it follows the substantive content and the sender’s signature. Where the email
is part of a lengthy chain, the email disclaimer usually appears at the very
bottom, thus making it even less likely to be spotted or read by the recipient.
Fourthly, the precise extent of the disclaimer may be uncertain, even if the
parties read it. Both samples provided above refer to the email and its
contents, but without making specific reference to any attachments. Does the
disclaimer cover only the wording in the email, or does it extend to any
attachments sent by the email? Related to this is the problem that arises
where the email is sent by a solicitor on behalf of a client, in which case, the
contractual effect of the email relates to the client, while the email
disclaimer—potentially—applies to the (lack of) contractual intention on the
part of the solicitor’s firm. The first example cited above does attempt to
address this problem, but the likelihood of success must be considerably
diminished when trying to ascertain the intention of one party (the client) by
reference to an email disclaimer drafted and appended for general use by
another (the firm). Moreover, even if the firm’s disclaimer were to be upheld,
there is of course the risk that the client wishes to rely on the contractual
effect of the email, contrary to the disclaimer, thus exposing the firm to an
action by its disgruntled client.
A fifth issue is that of authority. The email disclaimer is likely to have been
drafted and applied by or on the authority of the board of directors or the
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partnership board. It is therefore the explicit intention of the company or firm.
The email which has purported contractual effect may well have been typed
and sent by someone who does not have authority to bind the company or
partnership.76
When taken together, these five issues combine to create a number of
potential problems. The most important question to be resolved in this context
is whether the organisation is expressing its contractual intention through its
email disclaimer, or through the substantive content of the email. How can we
reconcile the situation when the email disclaimer states that the email shall not
be legally binding, in stark contrast to the content of the email, which states
that the sender is pleased to accept the previous offer from the recipient to
buy the stated goods at the stated price, and thereby holds the contract
between them concluded? And how is the court to deal with a situation where
an expressly contractual email is sent by someone who lacks authority to send
it, while the expressly non-contractual disclaimer has been applied on the
authority of the board of directors? In all these situations, the question to be
resolved is which is to be taken as the objective intention of the party: the
substantive content of the email or the email disclaimer?
As yet there has been little case law on the role of email disclaimers, but
Lord Hodge did consider them briefly in Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK)
Ltd in 2009, indicating that the email disclaimer did not affect the contractual
offer, which was contained in a document attached to the email:
‘‘Du Pont did not advance the argument set out in their defences that
their emails contained a standard disclaimer that the email did not
constitute a contractual offer or acceptance unless it was designated that
an e-contract was intended. Such an argument would have been incon-
sistent with [counsel’s] approach and would have been met by the response
that it was the attached proposal rather than the email which was the offer
document.’’77
In fact, in that case, the parties were in dispute as to the terms on which the
contract had been concluded, each seeking to advance their own standard
terms and conditions as the basis for the contract—so it would not have
helped either party to point to their own email disclaimer on the one hand,
while advancing their own terms and conditions, sent by email, on the other.
Further, the lack of weight given to the email disclaimer in Baillie Estates
Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd has to be balanced against the reality that there were
76 The third party may of course benefit from the agent’s apparent authority, or from statutory
protection, e.g. the power of directors is presumed not to be limited by the company’s constitution
in relation to their dealings with third parties, thereby protecting those acting in good faith: see
the Companies Act 2006 s.40. In relation to apparent authority, see Laura J. Macgregor, ‘‘Agency
and Mandate’’, in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue 2002, paras 49 and 75–83.
77 Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd [2009] CSOH 95 at [32], emphasis added.
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no detailed submissions from counsel on that point. However, there are a
number of possible options to consider.
It may be that in some cases performance can help to solve the problem: as
noted above, performance can be seen as indicative of contractual intention.
Accordingly, where the party goes ahead and acts on the basis of its email
contract, this could be treated as objective evidence of an intention to be
contractually bound.
Further, if parties do wish to ensure their intention is expressed as clearly as
possible, it would be open to them to ensure that any contractual document is
sent as an attachment, with clear wording on the front page, stating whether
the agreement is still at draft stage—and not intended to be contractually
binding—or whether the negotiations have concluded and this is intended to
be a contractually binding document.
Perhaps part of the solution lies in simply encouraging parties to take
account of their email disclaimer and to consider whether, on balance, it is
preferable to have a disclaimer which disclaims contractual intent, or not. At
any rate, it seems that the current practice of blanket email disclaimers,
broadly worded, provides a good example of commercial confusion, where the
right hand does not necessarily know what the left hand is doing.
Conclusion
Contract formation is increasingly tied to the consent of the parties as
evidenced not only through their agreement as to the essential terms, but also
their mutual intention to contract. This intention will be determined from the
available evidence, according to what each party objectively demonstrated,
subject to any trade practices or commercial customs which affect the parties.
However, so long as the parties are explicit about their intention to be
contractually bound, they can use this intention to retain control over the
moment of contract formation.
This would enable them, for example, to stipulate that there will be no
contract until the written document has been signed, regardless of the fact
that, at common law, there is no need for a written document, such that the
contract would otherwise be concluded once the parties have reached agree-
ment on the essentials. Conversely, they could demonstrate an intention to be
legally bound although there is no price, for example, or in extreme cases
where their agreement for land has not yet been reduced to formal writing.
Using intention to control the moment of contract formation should also, in
theory, allow parties to control, through their email disclaimers, whether or
not they are contractually bound by their emails. It seems that email
disclaimers have been developed to solve one problem (the danger of
unregulated, informal correspondence) without giving due consideration to
another: the importance of contractual intention.
The problem appears to arise either when the disclaimer does not cover the
precise facts, by referring to the content and not the attachment or, alter-
natively, where one party does indeed want to rely on the contractual effect of
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the email, despite their disclaimer. In this case, the courts will have to resolve
the question of which of two possible ‘‘intentions’’ it should attribute to the
party, taking into account all the circumstances of the case including of course
any performance of the contract. In the meantime, parties are urged to think
carefully about how they express their intention to be contractually bound, not
least when using email disclaimers.
